IWPR Institute (Mianeh)– The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s most outspoken critic late last month came as a blow to the opposition movement in Iran. But the void left by the loss of Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri may yet galvanise other senior Shia clerics into vocal criticism of the regime, thus shifting the equation in the opposition’s favour.

Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who died on December at the age of 87, effectively served as both spiritual leader and unifying force for Iran’s reform-minded opposition. Uniquely, he enjoyed popularity among secular activists and the intellectual elite as well as the devout.Shortly before Montazeri’s death, Iran’s Human Rights Defence Centre led by 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi marked the December 10 anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by recognising with its annual human rights award.

In a letter written the day after his death, Ebadi described Ayatollah Montazeri as the father of human rights in Iran.

(Photo- Arash Ashoorinia, www.Kosoof.com)

“When in 1988, you spoke out against the massacre of political prisoners…, I heard you, but I did not respond as I should have done,” wrote Ebadi, referring to Montazeri’s open criticism of the mass execution of prisoners which resulted in him being demoted from the position of anointed successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died in 1989.

The presence of tens of thousands of mourners at Montazeri’s funeral sent a clear message to the Iranian government. Despite all the authorities’ efforts to isolate the cleric in the years after Ali Khamenei took up the post of Supreme Leader following Khomeini’s death in 1989, his popular standing increased dramatically, so that he continued to be regarded as a senior figure in the political elite.

At a time when protesters have been expressing their anger at the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last June by chanting slogans directed against Supreme Leader Khameini, including phrases like “Down with the dictator”, Montazeri’s funeral showed that the independent clergy of Qom, who are opposed to the official version of Islam presented by the government, are on the rise. This is a force that cannot easily labeled “anti-Islam” despite its criticism of the religious establishment.

Montazeri’s religious credentials as a senior cleric and his mass popularity were his own, and could neither be granted nor revoked by the government, in the way that his position as Khomeini’s successor was.

In a country where a fatwa or ruling from a high-ranking ayatollah can often carry more force than a law passed by parliament, Montazeri’s voice both amplified and legitimised reformist ideas on human rights, Iran’s nuclear programme and many other issues.

In October, for instance, Montazeri issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, saying that, “nuclear armaments are not permitted by reason or by Sharia”. This statement was met by harsh criticism from the conservatives, including the hard-line newspaper Kayhan.

During the trials of protestors that got under way in August last year, the ayatollah questioned the reliability of forced confessions.

“Why are you perpetrating something that people are comparing to the trials in Stalin’s Russia and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq?” he asked the government.

Montazeri had the ability to bring together a wide range of opposition groupings ranging from the secularists to those with strong religious convictions. Such was his capacity to mobilise support that his word could have brought people into the streets, although he never used this power.

Many commentators believe it was his own bold criticism of the government that paved the way for others to start openly criticising the authorities. He repeatedly argued that “the legitimacy of government is founded on the votes and approval of the majority”. This reading of the Iranian constitution and of the theory of “velayat-e faqih”, the principle that underpins the position of Supreme leader, is a direct challenge to those pro-government ayatollahs who assert that the Leader’s legitimacy comes from God.

The positions he took on human rights, women’s rights, the legitimacy of government and the nuclear programme have become part of the reform movement’s manifesto.

Montazeri’s loss deprives the movement of a top religious figure, whose weight was an advantage in dealing with the hard-line government in Tehran.

Few other ayatollahs who have voiced support for the reform movement in recent years can come even close to filling the gap left by his passing. They do not have the same popularity, theological credentials, wide-ranging political backing, or indeed the courage to stand up and offer blunt criticisms not only of the government but also of the Supreme Leader himself.

For their part, it is clear the Supreme Leader does not plan to allow any other senior ayatollahs fill Montazeri’s shoes, nor will he tolerate an independent clergy in Qom, Isfahan or Shiraz. This was message was driven home when plainclothes officer attacked two grand ayatollahs seen as religious reformers, Yusuf Sanei and Ali Mohammad Dastgheib on December 28, only a day after Shia Muslims marked the holy day of Ashura.

However, sustained pressure on independent-minded clerics in the main religious centres could prove counterproductive for the authorities, resulting in a backlash where ayatollahs critical of the government coalesce, mobilise support against the regime, and even question the legitimacy of Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader.

One indicator of the way such clerical opposition could emerge is the decision by three respected ayatollahs – Ebrahim Amini, Abdollah Javadi-Amoli and Reza Ostadi – to stop presiding at Friday prayers because of the state-sponsored violence since the presidential election.

Ayatollah Montazeri’s contributions over many years on human rights, freedom of expression, women’s rights, and the legitimacy of government will keep the engine of the reformist movement running and encourage other independent religious figures to do likewise.

In the wake of his death, the battle-lines have been drawn. On the one side, the reformers will seek to promote a popular, pro-democracy senior ayatollah who will back their efforts and provide them with a connection to the religious foundations of the Iranian republic. On the other, the current administration will use all its resources to prevent such a new figure emerging.

Omid Memarian is an Iranian journalist and blogger based in San Francisco.

This article is an abridged and translated version of the full original text published on the Farsi pages of Mianeh, with editorial adjustments agreed with the writer made to provide clarity for English-language readers.

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