New Arsenal Emerges in Struggle over Iran’s Internet

NEW YORK, Jun 20, 2011 (IPS) - Millions of Iranians who have lived under an intense level of internet filtering and advanced monitoring systems for years may soon benefit from new technology that sidesteps the censors.

Last week, the New York Times reported that “the [Barack] Obama administration is leading a global effort to deploy ’shadow’ Internet and mobile phone systems that dissidents can use to undermine repressive governments that seek to silence them by censoring or shutting down telecommunications networks.”

One of these projects has been dubbed “Internet in a suitcase”. According to the Times, the suitcase - financed with a two-million- dollar State Department grant - could be smuggled across the border and quickly set up to allow wireless communication over a wide area with a link to the global Internet.“There are a number of research groups working on circumvention tools and alternative digital networks solutions to allow surpassing Internet censorship around the world,” Mehdi Yahyanejad, the co- founder of Balatarin.com, a popular website that played a pivotal role in mobilising protesters after Iran’s June 2009 contested presidential election, told IPS.

“The hope is that at least the news of such efforts would decrease the Iranian government’s resolve to enact a type of National Internet Network which would be cut off from the rest of the world,” he said.

In recent years, Iran has aggressively expanded its control over the Internet. In 2010, Iranian authorities announced the creation of the “Internet Police”, in charge of monitoring Persian-produced content.

The country has also long sought to create a “National Internet Network” to separate Iranians from the World Wide Web, a project said to cost some 1.5 billion dollars.

Since the 2009 polls, the Iranian opposition and dissidents have used the Internet as a mobilising force to bring people to the streets, embarrass the authorities for their wrongdoings, and generally challenge the dominant narrative of the government and its satellite media.

The Internet Police is ostensibly charged with “fighting internet- related crimes” and “protecting, assets, interests, and national secrets”. The chief of Iran’s national police force, Esmaeel Ahmadi Moghaddam, told reporters that “social networking on the Internet has imposed a heavy cost on the country.”

In early March, the minister of communication and technology said that a “National Network of Information” or “National Internet Network” will become operational in 18 months, or late 2012.

On Mar. 4, the Ministry of Communication and Technology declared that the “National Internet” would not be a replacement for the World Wide Web.

However, many believe that Iran’s ambitious plan to isolate the country further from the outside world is unrealistic and costly.

“Iran, unlike other countries that have highly restrictive access to the Internet - North Korea, Cuba, Burma - is a country with a functional, internationally-connected economy,” Cyrus Farivar, author of “The Internet of Elsewhere”, told IPS.

“It makes it hard to just pull the plug on it,” he said. “Remember, Iran’s Internet penetration rate is about 35 percent - so one in three Iranians. That’s a lot.”

Farivar believes Iran’s plan to build a National Internet Network would be difficult, but not impossible.

“Keep in mind that all the ISPs [Internet service providers] in Iran are currently controlled by the government and the Iranian government holds a lot of power over them,” he said.

“Not only can they filter, censor, monitor the Iranian Internet, but they can slow it down (as they did in June 2009), and conceivably turn it off completely if they wanted to. The reason why I say it would be hard to do is not for a technical reason, but rather an economic/social one.”

Others see Iran as drawing on the more restrictive policies of countries like China, although with significant differences.

“China is much more open than Iran to connect the world today and [has] more Chinese Internet businesses, including dozens of them listed in states’ stock markets which can sustain its domestic needs already,” Isaac Mao, a prominent Chinese activist and director of the Social Brain Foundation based in Hong Kong, told IPS.

“China is unlikely to separate itself from the world, neither sustain its censorship system longer for more years. In this practice, Iran is more like North Korea,” he said.

Ehsan Norouzi, an Iranian Internet activist and journalist, told IPS that Iran’s Internet war with the world is just another ideological war.

“The Iranian government has nothing to offer except for rhetoric and bluffs vis-a-vis actions that could change the equation, such as satellite internet, the internet suitcase, the balloon, or whatever else,” he said.

“It is the foreign media who are pumping up this subject, and this is exactly what the Iranian government wants,” Norouzi added. “They want to pretend that they are presenting the world with something new that contains their ideologies.”

Currently, almost all websites and blogs that criticise the government, along with social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter, YouTube and even a large number of lifestyle websites, are filtered inside Iran.

Some Iranian activists in the United States have repeatedly asked the U.S. government to provide financial support for efforts to get around Iran’s expensive filtering system. They’ve also asked the government to provide a satellite internet system by which people get access to the Internet without fear of being identified.

“Compared to what Iran is spending to curb people’s access to the Internet, what the U.S. is spending is too little,” a security network analyst in Tehran told IPS on the condition of anonymity.

“Iran has been able to acquire the equipment needed to enhance its restriction level over the internet, even though it’s been under severe economic sanctions, and is moving fast forward, but what Americans claim to do in countering the Iranian regime’s Internet, in terms of scale and effectiveness, is poor and politically motivated,” the analyst said.

June 20, 2011     Leave a Comment

The U.S. Pressures Iran on Human Rights

Huffington Post, Posted May 20, 2011- Many may be critical of America’s human rights policies, particularly its double standards when it comes to the records of its allies in the Middle East and beyond, not to mention in Bahrain. But human rights activists and organizations have welcomed the Obama administration’s presence at the Human Rights Council in Geneva since 2009. Like it or not, “without a strong U.S. counterweight, non-democratic states such as Cuba, Algeria, China and Pakistan joined forces to blunt the Council’s work and bully other states.”

The UN will appoint a special rapporteur for Iran in the weeks to come.

In Geneva, Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, the U.S. representative to the Council is a superstar. She is the face of U.S. human rights in town, a master of building coalitions and cooperation with different partners to make things happen. In an interview with me in Geneva, she responded to questions about the urgency and significance of establishing a monitoring mechanism for Iran, the role of politics in U.S. human rights policy, the perception of U.S. hypocrisy towards its friends and foes, her opinion about the Iranian officials’ allegations on the politicization of UN human rights mechanisms, and finally, why the U.S. is going aggressively after Iran’s human rights record. Excerpts from the interview follow:

What is the significance of establishing a special monitoring mechanism for Iran? How did the Human Rights Council get to this point?

First, as you probably know, we tabled a resolution [In March] with approximately 50 co-sponsors, cross-regional, with every region of the world represented. The reason it is significant is because the Council in the past has been resistant on taking initiative on what we call country-specific human rights situations. There is a general sense that countries are often fearful of being criticized and therefore they will protect other countries from being criticized by the council, so that when it comes their turn to being criticized, maybe others will stick with them. The US has been fairly strong in advocating for a review of everybody’s human rights records situation on their merits so this is very significant in the sense that many countries in the Council, and even some of the co-sponsors who are not members of the Council, are recognizing our responsibility to look at each human rights situation on their merit and decide if it warrants extra scrutiny. The case of Iran fits into that category very squarely from our point of view. We think that facts speak for themselves. The reason there is so much support for this cross regionally is because when it comes to human rights, the facts in the case of Iran are extreme. I can go on and on about that.

What has been the role of the U.S. in promoting special mechanism for Iran?

Significant. The U.S. has been a strong advocate of getting this special rapporteur. It is a new mechanism for the whole UN system, and we have been a leader in building the coalition, and yet, we believe that because the human rights situation is so outrageous, we are getting support from around the globe. We do not think that we have this coalition simply because other countries are simply doing the United States a favor. We do not see it essentially as a political statement between the United States and Iran.

This, really, is a condemnation of the atrocious behavior by the Iranian regime on its own people. This has been a chronic human rights situation for several decades, however, since the contested election in 2009, there has been an intensification of the crackdown on political opposition, there has been a spike in executions, particularly against political opposition, and also, there has been an increase against religious prosecution, women’s activists have been abused, and there has been an increase in brutality, of tactics used by the Iranian regime to squelch legitimate opposition. So, it’s both the chronic situation and this intensification.

Many believe that when it comes to human rights, the U.S. suffers from double standards. So Washington very critical about a country like Iran and at the same time play softball with a country like Saudi Arabia. What is your take on this?

Iran is one of, I think, three countries that has a recurring resolution at the General Assembly every year condemning its human rights violations. Those other countries all already have a country-specific mechanism focusing the world’s attention on the human rights situation. Iran has not had one, but that’s what this resolution will do. It will fill that gap. So, this is not about the United States’ assessment of the human rights situation in Iran; virtually it’s a consensus understanding that Iran is an outlaw in the international community, no matter how you look at it, when it comes to human rights. This is not the particular line of the United States; this is the condemnation of the international community with respect to human rights.

How much politics is involved in this?

We don’t see this, at least those of us who have been working in Geneva, laying the groundwork and seeking to build our coalition, we don’t see it as essentially political at all. Our work is about human rights. That’s why we told many other countries that this is not about pressure by the United States, and we haven’t been able to build this coalition because of pressure by the United States, it’s where facts speak for themselves, and the atrocities speak for themselves. One other thing I would say is the human rights defenders that have gotten out of Iran have made the case for us. When there is enough information coming out of Iran, we almost don’t need to argue at all, the case is made for us. One of the biggest concerns we have is that there has been a dampening down on the information we have been able to get out of Iran, and that is one of our biggest concerns. We think that if the facts were widely known and fully known, this case would have been made long ago. In that last year or so, the efforts to use intimidation and brutality to get those journalists and human rights advocates to be quiet has increased. It is a significant fact that they are either in jail or so intimidated that they would have to leave. Others have been brutalized or are just fearful, and those elements make us particularly concerned, because if you allow human rights activists to speak and the facts get out, we believe the facts would do the job. This case needs a little bit more help now, to make sure those facts get out, because there is such suppression of information.

What would be the message of establishing a special monitoring mechanism for Iran, for Iranians and government with similar characteristics?

I think there are a couple of important messages; one is about the institution of the Human Rights Council, and the other is about Iran itself. On Iran itself, it is that the international community understands that Iran is an outlaw when it comes to its human rights record. It’s not just one of a bunch of countries that have a different culture, or different values. It is an extreme case, and the international community is no longer willing to let it go without extra scrutiny and condemnation. The effect on the ground, we hope, would be to let the human rights defenders in that country, and those who are in prison or being tortured know that there is solidarity on the part of the international community with them, we are there to support them, we are using the pressure we have to further isolate the Iranian regime, and we want them to know that we will be supporting any movement toward democracy and greater liberty of human rights defenders there.

In terms of [the message] for the Council and other countries observing this, we have seen an improvement in the dynamics of the Council in recent months, particularly on the willingness of the membership of the Council to deal with crisis human rights situations that arise and dealing with them in almost real time and when it really matters. We saw it in the case of Libya, where we had another special session, and then, later in the G8, membership privileges were suspended because outrageous human rights violations were committed by the regime. I think that this case of Iran fits into that severe and crisis situation. It will have two kinds of effects on countries. Those who are human rights abusers will recognize they do not have impunity. They will not get away with it in the international community; that we will speak together and we will use our influence to put pressure on them to improve their human rights. And secondly, inside the Council–I think that it’s a wakeup call for everyone that we have a responsibility here. If you are a member of the Council, you have a duty to the international community to hold governments to account to universal human rights standards. This is not about regional blocks protecting each other’s membership within their own block, this is about living up to your responsibility to uphold all countries in the UN system to a higher standard.

No special rapporteurs have been allowed to visit Iran since 2005. There have been 80 inquiries from special procedures, and Iran has responded to only 8 of them. What is the guarantee that this will work? What are the consequences for the Iranian government if they don’t cooperate?

First of all, there is no guarantee, without a doubt. However, that context is very important, because it is an important piece of the rationale for this country-specific resolution. Those other special procedures are thematic; they have global responsibility for them, for torture, for arbitrary detention, etc. Part of our rationale for this initiative, the more chronic human rights aspect of this initiative, is what we call “radical non-cooperation” with UN human rights mechanisms, and that’s what they demonstrated with respect to all the special procedures in the past. The cases where they perhaps can say that they have given an invitation to someone regionally, we see as a charade, because they haven’t really. In fact, very recently, the High Commissioner who had made a request to go visit with certain conditions, just by pure coincidence that there has been a response to her inquiry, and it appears as though it is very much connected to the fact that this resolution was moving forward and they were making an attempt to manipulate the international community into thinking that all of a sudden they decided to cooperate. I don’t think it worked. I think the international community did not fall for it. Nobody believes that they are in fact going to cooperate. So, the argument is that if you have not done your cooperation in the past, we are not going to be fooled now. This additional, focused, country-specific condemnation type of resolution is necessary and this mechanism, focused on human rights violations, is warranted. Will they cooperate with it? It remains to be seen. But if they don’t, it will have two positive effects on human rights–further isolating the regime, and further unifying the international community against the regime. So it’s not about one country’s view of them politically. This is the international community saying “you’ve lost your legitimacy.” It’s a statement to that effect. In addition, it will support and hopefully embolden the remaining human rights people on the ground in Iran. It will help support the democracy advocates’ movement there, they will know that the international community is paying attention, and it supports them. I think that it will have beneficial effect.

There was a huge propaganda campaign against the U.S. by the Iranian delegation and the GONGO’s that were present in Geneva. How did you see the impact of this on the process?

It doesn’t have much effect. I think it is a kind of a sad statement about how much the Iranian regime thinks their propaganda will work, but it won’t work, and I think the international community can see through it. They believe that they can manipulate the public opinion about themselves and about other countries. I think they will fail, and I don’t think it has a big effect.

May 20, 2011     Leave a Comment

Iran Battles U.S. At UN Human Rights Council

GENEVA, Mar 21, 2011 (IPS) - Forty-nine United Nations member-states have co-sponsored a resolution asking for a special mechanism to monitor Iran’s human rights situation, which is expected to be voted later this week at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC).

Instead of responding to the criticism in the four-week long sixteenth session of the Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s delegation chose to bash the human rights situation in the United States, the country leading the effort to intensify pressure on Iran.

Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, the U.S. representative to the Council, told IPS that establishing a special monitoring mechanism for Iran by the HRC is very significant. “Because the council in the past has been resistant to taking initiative on what we call country specific human rights situation,” she said.

“There is a general sense that countries are often fearful of being criticized and therefore they would protect other countries from being criticized by the council so that when it comes their turn to being criticized maybe others stick with them,” she added.“We think the facts speak for themselves,” she maintained, referring to Iran’s human rights record and plead for a special mechanism at HRC. “The reason, there is so much support for this, cross regionally, is because the facts in the case of Iran are extreme when it comes to human rights.”

Observers attending the session believe that Iran’s verbal attacks on the U.S. will not be able to disrupt the consensus among the member states of the UNHRC, on the worsening human rights situation in the country.

A number of Western diplomats close to the process under way told IPS that the Iranian government had intensely lobbied with the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) to oppose the adoption of a special mechanism, but had not received vocal support.

The U.S. sponsored move obtained flanking support from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. He published on Mar 14 an interim report about the deteriorating rights situation in Iran, expressing serious concern about the Islamic Republic’s lack of regard for its international commitments such as the United Nations resolutions. In this report, the Secretary General pointed to 60 executions inside the Mashad Prison — executions the Iranian authorities have never announced.

According to reports by staff members of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, in discussions with their Iranian counterparts, they verified the accuracy of reports of executions earlier made by independent human rights organizations.

“The report highlights many areas of continuing concern for human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” stated Ban’s interim report. “The Secretary-General has been deeply troubled by reports of increased executions, amputations, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, and possible torture and ill-treatment of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and opposition activists.”

The Iranian delegation to the HRC’s current session did not comment on the report.

Under Item 4 of the HRC mandate, representatives from different countries stated in a list human rights violations in Iran, including pressure on human rights lawyers through imprisonment as in the case of Nasrin Sotoudeh; house arrest of two reformist political leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi; pressure on religious minorities such as the Baha’is; and torture inside the Iranian prisons.

Responding to criticism by the Council member states, the Iranian delegation used the time allocated for its response to focus on the violation of human rights in the U.S., such as water boarding, police brutality and violation of the rights of Native Americans. Sweden was one of the states supporting the resolution against Iran. The Iranian delegation also accused Sweden of violating the rights of minorities.

While HRC member states are requesting a special monitoring mechanism, or appointment of Special Rapporteurs for Iran, the Iranian government is at pains to bloc the move, with indirect backing of a dozen pro-government NGOs, accompanying the official delegation, which strongly support the regime’s record.

Members of the Iranian delegation comprising a number of high-ranking officials from the Iranian Judiciary and the Foreign Ministry, claims that the NGOs are genuine representatives of Iran’s civil society.

But independent human rights activists, present at the session, told IPS that these NGOs should be considered no more than a team of GONGOs. (Governmental Organized NGOs)

“The plane carrying the Iranian NGOs lands with the Iranian delegation,” said a western diplomat jokingly. “Iran has no resolve for improving the human rights situation, does not act upon the resolutions, does not answer the UN special procedures inquiries, and in the end, wishes to deflect attention from the deteriorating conditions of human rights through a propaganda circus.”

“The human rights team at the HRC session is an entirely political team and is not very familiar with human rights topics,” said a member of the Iranian delegation on condition of anonymity. “All efforts are focused on attacking the U.S. If they had asked the experts accompanying the delegation, they could have drafted better statements. But they don’t trust anyone other than themselves.”

But not all pro-government NGOs seemed to be happy with their presence at the session. “We are shocked with the anti-Iran atmosphere at the session. The Iranians in attendance at the session call us spies, traitors, mercenaries. It’s a very heavy atmosphere. In fact many of us didn’t even vote for Ahmadinejad; we voted for Mousavi. But everyone sees us as a part of the government,” said a, NGO member of the Iranian delegation.

“The new human rights body started on a very weak footing without the U.S. leadership,” Dokhi Fassihian, the Director of Washington-based Democracy Coalition Project that oversees the implementation of multilateral human rights strategies through the United Nations, told IPS. But Obama administration’s initiative against Iran indicated that things would change, she added. (END)

March 21, 2011     Leave a Comment

Reading Ahmadinejad via Wikileaks: A Freedom Lover or a Two-Bit Dictator?

Huffington Post,Posted: 01/31/11 - In a recent article for the Atlantic, Middle East expert Reza Aslan writes that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may not be the hard-line president outside observers actually thinks he is. Based on unverified WikiLeaks documents and remarks by the president himself, the author concludes that Ahmadinejad is, in fact, in favor of greater social and political freedoms and the “Persianization” of Iranian society, but is isolated among others in Iran’s current ruling establishment:

[Ahmadinejad]… is actually a reformer whose attempts to liberalize, secularize, and even “Persianize” Iran have been repeatedly stymied by the country’s more conservative factions… But if you oppose the Mullahs’ rule, yearn for greater social and political freedoms for the Iranian people, and envision an Iran that draws inspiration from the glories of its Persian past, then, believe it or not, you have more in common with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad than you might have thought.”

Here is why Aslan’s characterization of Ahmadinejad is flawed:Ahmadinejad is the kind of man who should not be judged by his words, but by his actions. As somebody who has met him on several occasions, once when he was Tehran’s mayor and twice when I was reporting on his trips to the UN in New York over the past few years, I can say I’ve never seen a more insincere, manipulative and deceptive personality in my entire life.

One doesn’t need WikiLeaks to know what Ahmadinejad has said about freedom. He has claimed openly that Iran is a free country where people have the right to express their opinions. He has also said that there are no gays in Iran. But his actions and Iran’s grim reality tell a different story.

Right after the 2009 election, dozens of prominent politicians, journalists, human rights lawyers and students were arrested, tortured, and put on trial. Some have said publicly that their arrest orders were signed several days prior to the election, illustrating the pre-planned nature of the arrests.

The post-election crackdown resulted in the killing of dozens of protesters and the arrests of more than 5,000 Iranian citizens. During the same period of time discussed by Aslan, Ahmadinejad’s intelligence forces managed the most notorious levels of mistreatment and abuse of political prisoners inside prisons.

Over the past months, a number of political prisoners have been executed based on fabricated files provided by Ahmadinejad’s Ministry of Intelligence.

Aslan’s reference to a WikiLeaks document that claims Ahmadinejad asked for more freedom for the Iranian people at a cabinet meeting in the midst of the post-election uprising, and that in response “the Revolutionary Guard’s Chief of Staff, Mohammed Ali Jafari, slapped Ahmadinejad across the face right in the middle of the meeting… ” is entirely a myth. No credible source has ever confirmed such an incident.

To speak about freedom for Iranians at a time when, under his command, the Iranian police, escorted the Basij paramilitary forces to brutally attack a dormitory at Tehran University, destroying the building, and injuring dozens of students, is duplicitous. The video of the attack, leaked by someone from within the intelligence community a few months later, leaves no doubt about the direct role of the police and Ahmadinejad’s allies in the brutal treatment of Iranian students. Several of those students would be dead the next day.

In fact, if it were not for the support of the Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s intelligence, and the paramilitary Basiji forces, it would have been impossible for Ahmadinejad to secure his second term in office, particularly after a massive uprising by the Iranian people.

Ahmdinejad appoints the Ministers of Interior, Intelligence, Culture and Telecommunications, and Ahmadinejad’s Minister of Interior assigns the police chief. Even 18 months after the election, arrests of political activists continue, mistreatment inside prisons continues, and the government’s opposition cannot hold any gatherings anywhere.

Ahmadinejad has full control over the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Telecommunications. The Ministry of Culture has actively restricted independent media and has raised the level of censorship to the point that criticizing the president’s policies by journalists is either impossible or has severe consequences for them. The Ministry of Telecommunications has also established the most advanced filtering systems in the world, coupled with allowing the Ministry of Intelligence to track and trap activists and students who are criticizing the government online.

Ahmadinejad’s readiness to make concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Reza Aslan’s reading of WikiLeaks, is another myth that does not fit the reality on the ground. Like his remarks on freedom and human rights in Iran, his public remarks on Iran’s nuclear program, are aimed to mislead the international community. The reality is that Ahmadinejad has made the nuclear issue in Iran a matter of national pride. And no one can seriously criticize the government’s position on this matter. He has mocked U.N. resolutions against Iran and has been publicly defiant regarding Iran’s nuclear program. It’s not surprising because the Iranian leadership has yet to come to a conclusion that concession with the West is necessary or serve the regime’s interests.

As a matter of principle, Iran’s supreme leader, and those who have managed Iran’s nuclear dossier, believe once they get to an irreversible point, meaning to the point where they acquire full fuel cycle, Western countries will be forced to accept a nuclear Iran, even if ultimately Iranians accept severe inspections. In fact, there has been no serious conversation on giving up uranium enrichment in Iran, or any kind of agreement that the West might appreciate. So Ahmadinejad’s lip service doesn’t really mean anything in Iran’s strategic nuclear policy, as we see that the negotiations go nowhere over and over again.

Furthermore, in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, Ahmadinejad is just a messenger, and a manipulative one. Neither Amadinejad nor Iran’s Parliament have control over Iran’s nuclear program — it is Iran’s supreme leader and a number of his advisers who draw the lines for the president and Iran’s negotiating team on the nuclear issue. So arguing that Ahmadinejad is a man of concession and the others, hard-liners, are in favor of confrontation and defiance is a misreading of Iranian politics.

WikiLeaks documents are memos written by U.S. diplomats based on their daily observations, their conversations with sources, media publications and even rumors they hear. It also reflects what American diplomats might have sensed, guessed or understood from a particular incident, trend and individual in a country. It’s hard to estimate how much of such information is factual and, more importantly, in which context these memos have been written and discussed.

We should not forget that the United States doesn’t have an embassy in Tehran and American diplomats have very little access to the major players in Iran. This makes an accurate reading of the events much more difficult.

Ahmadinejad’s remarks compared to his actual actions on Iran’s nuclear program and human rights indicate that he is not a man of his word. Many Iranians know him to be a pathological liar who says anything at anytime to manipulate his audience. What Aslan has pointed out is that Ahmadinejad’s dictatorial ambitions may in fact go beyond the Islamic establishment, and there should be no mistake about his ruthlessness and his ability to use violence to secure power at any cost.

January 31, 2011     Leave a Comment

Iran’s “Blogfather” Gets 20-Year Prison Sentence

SAN FRANCISCO, California, Sep 28, 2010 (IPS) — A week after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told heads of state gathered for the U.N. General Assembly in New York that his government does not jail its citizens for expressing their opinions, Iran’s Revolutionary Court sentenced Hossein Derakhshan, an internationally known Iranian-Canadian blogger, to 19 and a half years in prison.

On Monday, the conservative website Mashreq announced the verdict issued by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Courts.

Arrested in October 2008, Derakhshan had been charged with “cooperation with hostile states” and “propagating against the regime,” among other counts, the site said. In addition to the lengthy prison term, he was fined and banned from membership in political parties and work in the media for a period of five years.

“We are shocked,” one of Derakhshan’s relatives told IPS on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the case and fears of a backlash by security forces. “We never expected this to happen. Even according to Iranian laws, he has not done anything to deserve such a harsh sentence.”

Neither the family nor Derakhshan’s lawyer was aware of the sentence until it appeared on Mashreq’s website. His relative told IPS that Derakhshan did say that after two years in prison, “My state of uncertainty has finally ended,” referring to his long detention without any progress in his case.

Mohammad Ali Mahdavi, Derakhshan’s lawyer, told IPS that the verdict still has not been announced even to him. “I’m waiting for the official announcement to start working on the defence bill for the appeals court,” he said, adding, “I prefer to defend my client rather than bringing the case to the media as it might endanger the fate of the case at this phase.”

Judge Abolqasem Salavati is amongst three judges who are well-known for issuing long and harsh sentences for political prisoners, particularly the post-election detainees. His rulings have included the death sentence and numerous long-term prison sentences.

“I believe that first of all, the charges are totally unfounded, and the verdict demonstrates the injustice that many people have been talking about all these years,” Nikahang Kowsar, an award-winning Iranian cartoonist and blogger based in Toronto, where Derakhshan used to live, told IPS.

“Hossein wasn’t a very nice guy to many of us,” Kowsar said. “He criticized many journalists, bloggers and activists for being critical of the Iranian regime and ridiculing Iran’s leaders. He called us ‘agents of neo-liberalism’ or ‘enemies of Iran’ and tried to portray us as the ones willing to sell our nation to the West, but he was absolutely entitled to express his mind.”

Derakhshan, also known as Hoder, has been dubbed Iran’s “Blogfather” for his role in promoting blogging among Iranians via his popular website, hoder.com.

Immediately following the reform era in 1999, Derakhshan was a technology and internet columnist for one of the reformist newspapers in Tehran. In 2000, he moved to Canada and continued his work as a full-time blogger in Toronto.

In 2006, Derakhshan traveled to Israel as a Canadian citizen, a trip that caused a huge controversy in Iran and abroad, as Iranian law forbids Iranian citizens from traveling to Israel.

“We have a saying in Iran: ‘There is freedom of speech in Iran, but there is no freedom after speech in Iran,’” said Kowsar. “His captors are willing to make an example of him for others,” he added.

After years of criticizing the Iranian government, a few years ago Derakhshan started supporting Ahmadinejad. He launched a fierce attack against the government’s critics, including human rights activists, politicians, and journalists.

A source close to Derakhshan told IPS that his friends and colleagues warned him that traveling to Iran could be dangerous for him. “But he was positive that his support for Ahmadinejad and his government would protect him from being arrested,” said the source.

According the source, Derakhshan received the green light from a ranking official within the Ahmadinejad administration that his November 2008 trip to Iran would be tolerated. But a few days after his arrival in Tehran, he was arrested and sent to jail.

“Hossein had had some conversations with Press TV about working in their Tehran office,” Derakhshan’s mother, Ozra Kiarashpour, told the Kamtarin website on why he decided to come to Iran.

“Before his return to Iran, the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad promised Hossein that his trip would be without problems,” she said. “He had cleared his trip with this Council, which is governmental and which is in contact with the intelligence service. That’s why even though Hossein knew that they would call him to be questioned, he did not expect to be arrested like this and hadn’t told us what to do in case he was arrested.”

“A representative from the Council told us that they pursued his case on behalf of the Council but that unfortunately they couldn’t do anything further. Why are there such splits in the country’s security apparatus?” she asked.

Some believe that Derakhshan is being used as a pawn by certain political and security factions to justify the post-election crackdown and attempt to incriminate opposition political figures.

Mohammad Mostafie, a human rights lawyer who recently fled to Norway under pressure from the Iranian judiciary, told IPS that, “Several judges have gathered in a place they call the Revolutionary Courts, where they issue unfair, illegal, and inhumane rulings based on orders from security and intelligence forces.”

“Some of these judges, like Judge Salavati, obey the intelligence forces rather than the law and issue whatever they want, whether it’s a longtime prison sentence or a death sentence,” he said.

This story was published initially in the IPS News Agency

September 28, 2010     Leave a Comment

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